Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? - The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in the History of Ideas about Law by Case, Mary Anne
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2003
Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? -
The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore
as a Chapter in the History of Ideas about Law
Mary Anne Case
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Anne Case, "Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? - The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in
the History of Ideas about Law," 70 University of Chicago Law Review 55 (2003).
 Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional?
 The Equal Protection Component of Bush v Gore as a
 Chapter in the History of Ideas about Law
 Mary Anne Case t
 In this Essay, I am going to try to do what many distinguished legal
 scholars have said cannot and should not be done. I am going to take the
 equal protection holding in Bush v Gore' seriously. My project is loosely
 akin to intellectual history: I hope to show that much in the Court's opin-
 ion is indeed "reconcilable with the general jurisprudential commitments
 of the Justices,"2 for better or for worse.3 This seems an appropriate enter-
 prise for a second generation of scholarship on the decision, after some of
 the shouting has died down. Although most of the first generation of
 scholarly works that addressed the subject stressed how out of tune the
 decision was with the commitments of the justices who made it,4 a few
 identified increasingly familiar leitmotifs.5 Among those I, too, shall stress
 t Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law,The University of Chicago Law School.A version of this
 Essay was delivered to Chicago Law School alums under the title Looking at the Supreme Court
 Term Through Bush v Gore Tinted Lenses in October 2001. I am grateful to Philip Hamburger, Pam
 Karlan,Tracey Meares, Geof Stone, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and Lisa Van Alstyne for comments
 on drafts; to Al Alschuler, Frank Easterbrook, Jack Goldsmith, John Harrison, Dennis Hutchinson,
 Julie Roin, and David Weisbach for helpful conversations; and to Virginia Kim for research assis-
 tance.
 1 531 US 98 (2000).
 2 Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Cal L Rev
 1721, 1734 (2001). I shall seek such reconciliation at a jurisprudential, not a narrowly doctrinal,level.
 Certain ideas are in the air or part of the spirit of the times, apart from their articulation by the exact
 same justices in their majority opinion in a case in a direct precedential line leading to or from Bush
 v Gore.
 3 My project is different than arguing that the equal protection holding is sensible, that it will
 in fact be extended to future cases, or even that it was reached in good faith. An analogy may help
 clarify this point: Let us suppose that the Supreme Court had determined a winner in Bush v Gore,
 not by constitutional adjudication, but by divination, as the ancients often claimed to select leaders.
 In that case, it might be noteworthy whether the decision was framed by reference to astrology
 rather than palmistry or the reading of entrails, although it is possible to choose any of these tech-
 niques in good or bad faith, to apply any one well or badly by its own terms, and to make a choice of
 technique consistent with or divergent from one's usual choices. See Saul Lieberman, quoted in Cyn-
 thia Ozick, The Heretic: The Mythic Passions of Gershom Scholem, New Yorker 143, 145 (Sept 2,
 2002) ("Nonsense is nonsense, but the history of nonsense is scholarship.").
 4 An exception was their tendency to arrogate all decisionmaking power to themselves and
 mistrust other constitutional actors, which commentators frequently noted.
 5 Those who have undertaken such an analysis in the most depth have concentrated on cases
 involving voting rights and related issues of democracy. See, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing
 Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 NC L
 Rev 1345 (2001) (situating the case in a line emphasizing "structural" equal protection); Richard H.
 Pildes. Democracy and Disorder. 68 U Chi L Rev 695 (2001) (seeing the case as consonant with the
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 are commitments to rules over standards, theoretical abstractions over
 messy realities, "surface appearance"6 over what lies beneath, and uni-
 formity over diversity.
 At a high level of abstraction, Bush v Gore holds that standards must
 be reduced to rules. Several things are of note here. First, from the per-
 spective of the history of ideas about law, this is a recurring proposition,
 at one extreme in the arc of a pendulum that has been swinging for centu-
 ries between the forms of action and the Chancellor's foot.7 The most re-
 cent full arc of this pendulum on the Court extends from Bush v Gore
 back to the Burger Court's concern with irrebuttable presumptions. For a
 time in the early 1970s, across a wide spectrum of subjects from voting
 rightsx to sex and gender,9 a Court majority took a position diametrically
 opposite to the Bush v Gore majority, repeatedly holding, in effect, that
 the Constitution required rules to be relaxed into standards."' Had the
 majority that decided Vlandis v Kline,"l or Cleveland Board of Education
 v La Fleur" been faced with the Florida election laws, they not only would
 have seen no difficulty with an "intent of the voter" standard, they would
 likely have found objectionable any attempt, through rigid and arguably
 overbroad uniform rules, to preclude an individualized assessment of
 voter intent. From the moment of his appointment to the Court, however,
 Justice Rehnquist set his face against his brethren's insistence on turning
 rules into standards. While his brethren saw dangerous arbitrariness in
 unbending rules, Rehnquist's vision of equal protection and due process
 focused on the dangers of individualized discretion. He was finally able to
 turn his dissenting views into a majority opinion in Weinberger v Salfi,'3
 the case that definitively swung the pendulum back in the direction of
 Court's previously revealed distaste for the messy disorder of democracy).
 6 Laurence H. Tribe, ero G. v hsuB: Through the Looking Glass, in Bruce Ackerman, ed, Bush
 v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy 39,46 (Yale 2002).
 7 Longtime University of Chicago law professor Kenneth Culp Davis was one of those who
 tracked the pendulum as it swung, in his view, too far in the direction of discretion. See generally
 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (Louisiana State 1971).
 8 See, for example, Carrington v Rash, 380 US 89,96 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a con-
 clusive presumption that soldiers were not bona fide residents of the town in which they were sta-
 tioned).
 9 See, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 658 (1972) (mandating individualized
 determination of a nonmarital father's fitness as a parent).
 10 I have discussed at length the relationship between this Burger Court tendency and the de-
 velopment of modem constitutional sex discrimination law in Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype
 the Law Condemns ": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Questfor Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell
 L Rev 1447,1466-69 (2000).
 11 412 US 441,452(1973) (mandating an individualized assessment of an incoming student's in-
 tent to become a state resident).
 12 414 US 632,643 (1974) (striking down uniform cutoff dates for pregnant teachers to leave
 the classroom).
 13 422 US 749,771-83 (1975) (upholding a bright-line rule for conferring survivor's benefits).
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 rules, a direction in which it kept swinging until the arc reached a peak in
 Bush v Gore.
 Justice Scalia is perhaps most famous for his insistence on "the Rule
 of Law as a Law of Rules." 14 But, given that Rehnquist for decades has ar-
 gued that a "preference for 'individualized determination[]' is in the last
 analysis nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking,"15
 his willingness to join the Bush majority in insisting on "specific rules de-
 signed to ensure uniform treatment" is, like Scalia's, consistent with at
 least some of his longstanding jurisprudential commitments.16
 Indeed, as commentators have observed, a repudiation of standards
 in favor of rules has been a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court in statutory,
 as well as constitutional, cases. Thus, for example, Alan Schwartz has
 noted in the Court's bankruptcy cases what can be seen as well in Bush v
 Gore, to wit, that, even when the text of a statute "is intended to confer
 on administrators a large discretion, ... [t]he Court ... exhibits a strong
 tendency to transmute ... standards into bright line rules that maximally
 confine []discretion."'7 To "advance the rule of law virtues of certainty
 and predictability," the Court refuses to "construe statutory standards as
 standards.""'
 Even Justices Souter and Breyer, who agreed with the majority that
 Florida's recount had equal protection problems despite strong dis-
 agreement on remedy, each has some history of exhibiting "preference for
 categorical treatment""9 over "standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case
 determinations."2 In Atwater v Lago Vista, argued within a week of
 Bush, Souter's majority opinion concededly valued the "clarity and sim-
 14 In his article of that title at 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,1176 (1989), Scalia presages the Bush ma-
 jority when he argues "[s]tatutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or precision
 are ... ,on that account,... in the extreme, unconstitutional."
 15 Cleveland Board of Education, 414 US at 660 (Rehnquist dissenting). See also Scalia, 56 U
 Chi L Rev at 1176 (cited in note 14) (repudiating "one image of how justice is done-one case at a
 time, taking into account all the circumstances").
 16 See, for example, Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore:An Anticipatory Intellectual
 History, 90 Georgetown L J 113,123 (2001) (noting that Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Allegheny
 Pittsburgh Coal Co v County Commission, 488 US 336 (1989), involving arbitrary and "widely
 varying assessments of property currently worth essentially the same amount").
 17 See Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court's
 Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 NY L Sch L Rev 149,154,185 (2001) (direct quotes are taken from ab-
 stract in SSRN, online at http://ssrn.com/id=271817).
 18 Id at 152-53. To say that the Rehnquist Court values rules and wishes to constrain discretion
 does not mean its members agree on how best to do this. Consider, for example, US Airways, Inc v
 Barnett, 122 S Ct 1516 (2002), in which the Breyer majority, O'Connor concurrence, and Scalia's dis-
 sent each elevated the value of "fair, uniform treatment," id at 1524,1526-28, 1531-32,but took a dif-
 ferent view of how best to attain it.
 19 Atwater v Lago Vista, 532 US 318,326-27 (2001) (Souter) (upholding the custodial arrest and
 imprisonment of a mother for violating a seatbelt law, a misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of
 fifty dollars).
 20 Id at 347.
 21 532 US 318 (2001).
 58 The University of Chicago Law Review [70:55
 plicity" of "readily administrable rules" over justice in the individual
 case.22 Before joining the Court, Breyer was "the guiding force" 3 behind
 an enterprise whose vision of equality in the uniformity of rules has much
 in common with Bush v Gore's -the current incarnation of the Federal
 24
 Sentencing Guidelines.
 Shortly before it held the Florida vote recount unconstitutional be-
 cause it gave officials too much unfettered discretion, the Court did the
 same for the Chicago Gang Loitering Ordinance.25 In their concurrences,
 both Justices O'Connor and Breyer stressed the constitutional difficulties
 with a law's failure to provide "sufficient minimal standards to guide law
 enforcement officers."26 Both Justices O'Connor and Breyer had previ-
 ously expressed great concern with the "arbitrary results" that can follow
 from an absence of "meaningful standards" to "constrain []discretion" in
 the punitive damages context.2 The belief that such standards could have
 22 Acknowledging Atwater had suffered "pointless indignity and confinement" and "gratuitous
 humiliation," Souter admitted that "if we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested
 facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail." Id at 321, 346.
 23 Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging 58 (Chicago 1998).
 24 Both enterprises, starting with what seemed like arbitrary and unjustifiable variations in
 judging, focused on the need to eliminate apparent disparities and impose greater uniformity by rule,
 but were subject to the criticism that they sought to reduce to rigid formulae events not fairly capa-
 ble of such mechanical reduction. Compare Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging 58,84 (cited in note
 23):
 By largely eliminating . .. the power of any individual to consider the circumstances of the
 crime and of the defendant in their entirety. .. the Guidelines threaten to transform ... sen-
 tencing into a puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of persons -
 abstract entities to be defined by a chart, their concrete existence systematically ignored and
 thus nullified.
 with Tribe, eroG .v hsuB: Through the Looking Glass at 44 (cited in note 6) (decrying the "illusion of
 a technical 'fix' ... [by] justices who acted as though machine-like algorithms could workably replace
 human judgment"). In each case, it may be a question of picking your poison. Is it more disturbing
 when the appearance of disparate, even arbitrary, treatment covers the reality of more uniform
 treatment once all not immediately visible factors are taken into account, or alternatively, when an
 appearance of uniform treatment masks the reality of arbitrary, disparate treatment?
 25 Of course, this sort of criminal ordinance is a much more usual site of worry over excess dis-
 cretion.
 26 Chicago v Morales,527 US 41,65-66(1999) (O'Connor concurring);id at72 (Breyer concur-
 ring). Ironically, Scalia, in dissent, criticizes precisely this attitude on the part of his brethren in terms
 familiar from criticisms of Bush v Gore:
 As far as appears from Justice O'Connor's and Justice Breyer's opinions, no []officer may issue
 any order ... unless the standards for the issuance of that order are precise. No modern urban
 society ... could function under such a rule.... [E]ven if it were possible to list in an ordinance
 all of the reasons that are known, many are simply unpredictable.
 Id at 87. See also Richard Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla St U L Rev 811,
 828 (2001) ("Even on the face of a single ballot, there is an infinite range, across several dimensions,
 of evidence bearing on the intent of the voter.").
 27 See, for example, Pacific Mutual Life v Haslip, 499 US 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor dissenting)
 ("[S]uch instructions are so fraught with uncertainty that they defy rational implementation. Instead,
 they encourage inconsistent and unpredictable results.... I see a strong need to provide juries with
 standards to constrain their discretion.... The Constitution requires as much."); BMW of North
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 been, but were not, articulated for the counting of votes in Florida was
 central to the Bush per curiam equal protection holding.
 If I were to identify a single decisive moment in the oral argument of
 Bush v Gore, it would be the moment when Justice Kennedy, putative au-
 thor of the per curiam opinion, asked David Boies "from the standpoint
 of [the] equal protection clause, could each county give their own inter-
 pretation to what intent means, so long as they are in good faith and with
 some reasonable basis finding intent? ... Could that vary from county to
 county?" 28 Boies, the consummate practitioner, whose view is from the
 trenches, responded by acknowledging what for him is an obvious reality
 of his experience:
 I think it can vary from individual to individual.... I think on the
 margin, on the margin, . . . whenever you are interpreting intent,
 whether it is in the criminal law, an administrative practice, whether
 it is in local government, whenever somebody is coming to govern-
 ment.... I think there are a lot of times in the law in which there can
 be those variations from jury to jury, from public official to public
 29
 official.
 If the tone of Boies's answer can be summarized by the colloquial,
 "Well, duh!", the tone of Kennedy's reaction harks back to an earlier
 catch phrase: "I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on
 here." Unlike the cynical and corrupt French police officer in Casablanca
 with whom the line originated, however, Justice Kennedy actually
 sounded shocked.30 "But here you have something objective," Kennedy
 insisted:
 You are not just reading a person's mind. You are looking at a piece
 of paper, and the supreme courts in the states of South Dakota and
 America v Gore, 517 US 559, 587-88 (1996) (Breyer concurring, joined by O'Connor and Souter)
 ("Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice ... helps to assure the uni-
 form general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself... .The standards
 the Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary re-
 sults.").
 28 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Gore, No 00-949, 49-50 (Dec 11, 2000), online at
 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html (visited Dec 2,2002). Kenneth Starr also identifies this
 exchange as decisive. See Kenneth Starr, FirstAmong Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life
 275-76 (Warner 2002).
 29 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Gore, No 00-949,50-52 (cited in note 28) (internal in-
 terjections omitted).
 30 The line, of course, is from the movie Casablanca (Warner Brothers 1942), and the parallel to
 Bush v Gore can be extended. Like the Bush v Gore majority, the officer faced a scene of political
 disorder, with French and Germans, rather than Democrats and Republicans, competing noisily.
 Asked to shut down the scene by the numerically weaker but politically more powerful Germans, the
 officer originally demurs saying he "has no excuse to" do so.Told to "[f]ind one," he complies, declar-
 ing, "This cafe is closed until further notice." When asked by the proprietor, "How can you close me
 up? On what grounds?" the officer responds with the line quoted in the text, just as a cafe employee
 hands him his winnings from the gambling table.
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 the other cases have told us that you will count this hanging by two
 corners or one corner, this is susceptible of a uniform standard, and
 yet you say it can vary from table to table within the same county.3
 A cynical observer, who views the Court as no more naive than
 Casablanca's police, might claim that the precedent most directly relevant
 to Bush is the census enumeration case.32 The same majority that decided
 for Bush decided that case, also knowing that the decision it reached
 would advantage the Republican party over Democrats.33 The cases both
 involved a conflict over concepts of accuracy in tallying. Some have sug-
 gested that the political character of both decisions is evidenced by a re-
 versal of arguments by all sides in the two cases.34 But I actually see the
 approach of the majority as consistent in the two cases -in each case it
 opted for the superficial appearance of precision- after all, what can be
 less manipulable, less fuzzy than "actual enumeration" or more precise
 and accurate than a machine recount? Yet imprecision lurked beneath the
 surface in both cases. Included in the count the Court accepted was data
 that suffered from exactly the same problems as that rejected in both the
 Florida election36 and the census.37
 Florida election3 and the cenSUS.
 31 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Gore, No 00-949,50 (cited in note 28).
 32 Department of Commerce v House of Representatives, 525 US 316,335-43 (1999) (interpret-
 ing the statute at issue to prohibit statistical sampling for use in calculating the population for appor-
 tionment purposes).
 33 This is because it is predictably more likely to be voters in Democratic groups, such as "rent-
 ers, residents of large cities, and racial minorities," Nathaniel Persily, Book Review, The Right to Be
 Counted, 53 Stan L Rev 1077, 1081 (2001), who are most susceptible to undercount in an enumera-
 tion but to inclusion through statistical sampling. Note that, as with the continued counting of votes
 under a broad standard of voter intent in Florida, the advantage to Democrats and corresponding
 loss to Republicans can only be the subject of an educated guess, not a certainty, at the time the
 Court decides. And, in both cases, the effect of the Court's decision is to cut off a full comparison of
 the workings of the two methods. Note also that in both cases those less likely to be counted are
 more likely to be poor, racial minorities, or immigrants.
 34 See id at 1077 (seeing both cases as "pitting humans against machines" and claiming that
 "consistency of argument ... took a back seat to the logic needed to win" with "[t]hose who argued
 against a manual recount of ballots usually demand[ing] that only manual methods" be used for the
 census and vice versa). But see Tushnet, 90 Georgetown L J at 117 (cited in note 16) (noting the simi-
 larity of lineup but claiming the two cases "clearly raised legal questions that had nothing whatever
 to do with each other").
 35 Fortunately, the census could provide what Florida could not-a remedy for the worst of the
 undercounting: "Republican lawmakers sought to counter the charge that their opposition to adjust-
 ment reflected their resignation to the differential undercount and an inaccurate census. ... Republi-
 cans adopted a 'roll up your sleeves' approach,' which translated into an additional billion dollars ...
 to make the headcount more accurate." Persily, 53 Stan L Rev at 1097 (cited in note 33).
 36 Consider, for example, the Rehnquist concurrence's assertion that there is "no basis for read-
 ing the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots" Bush, 531 US at 120.
 Even assuming, arguendo, that were true, this shouldn't solve the majority's equal protection prob-
 lem, but rather further complicate it. It is clear that at least some improperly marked ballots were in-
 cluded in the existing tally. Remember the many imperfectly marked absentee ballots counted for
 Bush? Combining the majority's rigid "treat like ballots alike" model with the Rehnquist view of
 voter error, the reviewing court, instead of searching for yet more valid ballots among the imperfectly
 marked, would need to undertake the perhaps equally massive task of throwing out all those ballots
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 A non-cynical observer, assuming Justice Kennedy was indeed sin-
 cere in his shock, might see even more frightening implications. Among
 these are, as Linda Greenhouse has observed, that on the Rehnquist
 Court, "something vital has been lost - a framework for seeing the world
 in all its gritty reality from inside the marble cocoon." There are several
 related dangers to this cocooned perspective. The first is simply the ap-
 parent lack of awareness of just how thoroughly, in the words of Justice
 Ginsburg's Bush dissent, "we live an imperfect world." 39 As Boies, to-
 gether with Ginsburg and Stevens (the only two Justices not to find equal
 protection problems with the Florida recount), realized all too clearly,
 there were, indeed "a lot of times in the law in which there can be those
 variations.""" To hold each such variation an equal protection violation
 would be paralyzing; to focus on the relatively trivial deviations in count-
 ing standards and ignore much larger disparities is, as the Bush dissenters
 point out, to worsen inequality under the guise of curing it.41
 The second danger is the Court's susceptibility to the illusion that by
 intervening it can achieve greater perfection. In the case of Bush v Gore,
 examining this illusion begins with the empirical question of whether the
 standard of voter intent can fruitfully be reduced to uniform rules. The
 majority finds that "the formulation of uniform rules ... is practicable."42
 Well, yes, it almost always is, but practicable does not mean fair,44 or, in
 that, though defective, were counted anyway. The fact that the Rehnquist concurrence does not de-
 mand this resonates with its joiners' view of merit in affirmative action cases -anyone who managed
 to slip through already, regardless of whether he actually punched his ticket correctly, is by virtue of
 little more than that alone, innocent, meritorious, and worthy of protection.Anyone who hasn't is out
 of luck, even if the reason is, for example, inferior resources in poor neighborhoods. See Spencer
 Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 Fla St U L Rev 469,472
 (2001) (criticizing the Court's "merit-based vision" of voting).
 37 See Department of Commerce, 525 US at 363 (Stevens dissenting) (noting various forms of
 sampling already necessarily used in enumeration).
 38 Linda Greenhouse,Ideas & Trends:Impolitic; The Separation of Justice and State,NYTimes
 ? 4 at 1 (July 1,2001) (criticizing justices for "blithely assum[ing]" that defending the Paula Jones suit
 "would not be a burden for" Clinton).
 39 531 US at 143.
 40 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Gore, No 00-949,52 (cited in note 28).
 41 See, for example, 531 US at 145-46 (Breyer dissenting).
 42 Id at 106 (majority).
 43 For example, "off with their heads," is a rule, but not one well suited to the demands of the
 Constitution. That the arbitrariness of uniform rules has dangers equal and opposite to the arbitrari-
 ness of individualized discretion became clear in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence as it oscil-
 lated from fears of standardless discretion in Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) to fears in later
 cases, such as Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978), of rules too rigid to allow all appropriate mitigating
 factors to be taken into account.
 44 As Richard Friedman (a specialist, it should be noted, in the law of evidence) put it in Trying
 to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla St U L Rev at 828 (cited in note 26):
 Certainly uniform rules could be developed, but they would not necessarily be very good rules
 for determining a voter's intent.... Any simple rule by definition will exclude relevant informa-
 tion from the inquiry and so inevitably lead to inaccurate determinations. Any complex rule will
 inevitably lead to variations in application, even if one entity makes all the decisions; ask any-
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:11:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 62 The University of Chicago Law Review [70:55
 anything but the most formalistic sense,45 offering the equal protection of
 the law to persons." Nevertheless, a willingness to, as Pam Karlan puts it,
 "achiev[e] esthetic regularity at significant cost,,47 may be another hall-
 mark of the Rehnquist Court.
 Not only has the "Court ... strained at a gnat only to swallow an ele-
 phant"48 but also, like the scribes and pharisees, it binds heavy burdens
 and lays them on others' shoulders.49 The same Court that faults Florida
 officials for failing clearly to articulate and consistently to apply a rule of
 decision has notoriously been unable to formulate such rules itself, par-
 ticularly in those areas Karlan and I have referred to as "the new Re-
 drupping."5 This raises the paradox that, if Florida's recount is unconstitu-
 tional, so is much of what the Supreme Court itself has done and fails to
 do. Since the Court is a "[nation]wide court with the power to assure
 body who has to perform a recurring task of any complexity, such as calling balls and strikes
 throughout a baseball game.
 45 This may be enough for some members of the Bush majority. In Law of Rules, Scalia uses
 the example of a parent making rules for children's television viewing to stress that what matters is
 that all get treated alike in an immediately observable way, not the reason for such treatment or the
 relevant differences among those affected by the rule. See 56 U Chi L Rev at 1177 (cited in note 14).
 But children, like voters, differ in respects relevant to the application of rules governing them.While
 it may be simpler to impose superficial uniformity, it should matter whether the child allowed to
 "watch television when the others do not" is older or younger, whether the program is of special in-
 terest or importance to him or her, whether s/he has completed all chores and homework first, etc.
 46 Compare Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533,580 (1964) ("Again, people, not land or trees or pas-
 tures, vote.").
 47 Karlan, 79 NC L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 5). A concern for the surface appearance of regu-
 larity is not quite the same as a commitment to rules, despite some overlap. Although they are gener-
 ally less insistent on rules than some of their brethren, appearances seem to matter most to Justices
 Kennedy and O'Connor, the Justices most closely associated with the Bush v Gore per curiam equal
 protection holding. Particularly in both her Establishment Clause and her reapportionment jurispru-
 dence, O'Connor has repeatedly and explicitly insisted that "perceptions" and "appearances do mat-
 ter." See, for example, Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630,647 (1993). For further discussion, see Mary Anne
 Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses, 2000 S Ct
 Rev 325, 354. Justice Kennedy's concern for the constitutional dimensions of appearances comes
 through, for example, in his dissent in Stenberg v Carhart, the partial birth abortion case, where he
 stresses the state's interest, even in cases where some form of abortion will in any event take place, in
 banning a form of abortion that, because of its "stronger resemblance to infanticide ... presents a
 greater risk of disrespect for life." 530 US 914,963 (2000).
 48 Karlan, 79 NC L Rev at 1365 (cited in note 5).
 49 See Matthew 23:4.
 50 See, for example, Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future ofAffirmativeAction from the Past
 of the Religion Clauses, 2000 S Ct Rev at 353-54 n 114 (cited in note 47) (describing the Court's "par-
 ticularistic examination of individual cases in [ ] area[s] for which it has been unable to articulate a
 workable test of general applicability," including Establishment Clause cases involving use of public
 property for religious holiday displays and the Shaw v Reno line of voting rights cases). For an expla-
 nation of the origin of the term "Redrupping" see note 54.
 51 The argument I make here is not undercut by the Bush majority's explicit statement that its
 "consideration is limited to the present circumstances," 531 US at 109, because the particular charac-
 teristics of those "circumstances" explicitly enumerated by the Court, namely a "court with the power
 to assure uniformity ... order[ing] a [ ] remedy" without assuring compliance with "the rudimentary
 requirements of equal treatment" are precisely what I am focusing on here.
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 uniformity" and since it frequently these days "orders a [nationlwide
 [remedy] with minimal procedural safeguards," is every failure to grant
 certiorari now a potential equal protection violation, at least where fun-
 damental rights are at stake? Is a conflict in the circuits now unconstitu-
 tional? What assurance have we that "the rudimentary requirements of
 equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied" in that vast bulk
 of Rehnquist Court cases in which a court majority shows itself unwilling
 or unable to articulate standards that bind its discretion or that of lower
 courts?
 As an example of the application of impermissible arbitrariness, the
 Bush majority cites a Dade monitor who testified to having "observed
 that three members of the county canvassing board applied different
 standards in defining a legal vote."52 But the three members of the board
 each examined all disputed ballots and voted on them,53 so, assuming, as
 the majority appears to, that the board's votes were cast in good faith, the
 fact that each member applied his or her own standard does not mean
 that the results over a range of ballots were at all arbitrary or inconsistent.
 In the days of Redrupping,- the nine members of the Court did far worse.
 Each of them applied his own standard of obscenity in viewing a film, and
 voted, without bothering to articulate reasons. What was at stake was not
 the validity of a ballot, but the constitutionality of a prison term-
 sometimes up to twenty years. But, like a ballot, an allegedly obscene film
 or photo is "scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of ... paper.... The
 factfinder confronts a thing, not a person."55 In the days of Redrupping,
 the Court was not "confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform
 treatment."956 Is it today, given the multitude of cases in which, judging by
 the proliferation of concurrences, "members of the [Court] appl[y] differ-
 ent standards in defining" the law?57
 Just as with the irrebuttable presumption cases, so with Bush v Gore,
 to take the holding seriously "would turn the doctrine ... into a virtual
 engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have
 heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
 52 Id at 106.
 53 See, for example, Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyers' Role in Selecting the President:A Complete
 Legal History of the 2000 Election, 8 Tex Wes L Rev 105,208-09 (2002).
 54 Taking its name from Redrup v New York, 386 US 767 (1967), this was the era, from 1967-73,
 of "per curiam reversals of convictions for the sale or exhibition of materials that at least five mem-
 bers of the Court, applying their separate tests, deemed not to be obscene." Geoffrey R. Stone, et al,
 Constitutional Law 1169 (Aspen 4th ed 2001).
 55 531 US at 106. The captions on many obscenity cases made this quite clear, naming no per-
 son, just the inanimate object. See, for example, United States v 12 200-Ft Reels of Super 8MM Film,
 413 US 123 (1973); United States v 56 Cartons Containing 19,500 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Hel-
 lenic Sun", 373 F2d 635 (4th Cir 1967).
 56 Bush, 531 US at 106.
 57 Id.
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:11:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 64 The University of Chicago Law Review [70:55
 Amendments."58 Unlike its predecessors, however, the Bush majority ex-
 plicitly disclaims any role as a broad agent of destruction. The role in
 which it casts itself is, instead, that of restorer of order. This is a role au-
 thor Tom Wolfe once ascribed to the waitresses at Schrafft's, whose activi-
 ties, as he described them,59 had much in common with those of the Bush
 majority. According to Wolfe, at Schrafft's "esthetic regularity" and uni-
 formity was all important:
 [T]he idea was to pace one's consumption along with everyone else's
 at the table, so that one did not finish up more than thirty seconds
 ahead of anyone else and, furthermore, so that one's very last bite -
 the final shape -would be a perfect miniature of the original cheese-
 burger ... with precisely the same proportions of hamburger, cheese,
 and bread ... as the cheeseburger ... had at the outset."'
 Another way of phrasing the central question posed by the equal
 protection holding of Bush v Gore would then be, when does the Consti-
 tution permit one to order simply a plain hamburger or a grilled cheese
 sandwich?6' And when will the courts intervene to reestablish the propor-
 tions, like the waitresses at Schrafft's who, "underst[anding] ... about the
 final shape and its importance," whisk away one's plate to add just the
 right amount of extra cheese when a careless customer, having "eaten it
 incorrectly" would otherwise be left with "a perfect mini-burger two
 inches in diameter ... except that the cheese was all gone ?62
 58 Weinberger, 422 US at 772 (Rehnquist).
 59 Tom Wolfe, Honks and Wonks in Mauve Gloves and Madmen, Clutter and Vine 216,277
 (Farrar 1976).
 60 Id at 227.
 61 One context in which this question will inevitably come up is that of the continuing viability
 of local community standards for obscenity, a question the Court began to take up last term, but has
 yet to answer definitively. See Ashcroft v ACLU, 122 S Ct 1700 (2002) (rejecting a facial challenge to
 the community standards component of the Child Online Protection Act, but remanding for further
 factfinding). The possibility that varying community standards may raise constitutional issues poten-
 tially extends far beyond the obscenity context, however.Thus, for example,Justice Marshall's dissent
 in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,708 (1984) noted, with respect to a claim of ineffective assis-
 tance of counsel, that "[t]he debilitating ambiguity of an 'objective standard of reasonableness' ... is
 illustrated," inter alia, by "the fact that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants
 in different parts of the country varies significantly." Marshall asked, "Should the standard of per-
 formance mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale?" Id. Bush v Gore may give such ques-
 tions new salience. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Community Standards and the Mar-
 gin of Appreciation, in Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, Grundrechte, Civil Rights (Norbert Engel,
 ed) (forthcoming 2003).
 62 Wolfe, Honks and Wonks at 227 (cited in note 59).
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